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Forging 'Soft' Accountability in Unlikely Settings: The Prospects of Mutual Accountability in South-South Cooperation

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2014. 4

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Abstract

This paper introduces the concept of ‘soft’ accountability as a new approach to understand the mutual accountability (MA) mechanism in the setting of South-South Cooperation (SSC). In doing so, this study has analysed three components of accountability (responsibility, answerability, and enforceability), and identified actors and modalities of MA in four different situations of SSC mechanism. The main finding of the study has shown the importance of linking MA mechanisms both at the national level and the international level in the frame of SSC in order to strengthen MA mechanisms. Furthermore, this paper has suggested establishing an institutional and sustainable development platform for SSC MA. In the light of this, the paper proposes to launch a new ‘global accountability initiative’ for SSC as a way of transition from the Busan Global Partnership to Sustainable Development Goals in the Post-2015 Development Framework.

Forging ‘Soft’ Accountability in Unlikely Settings: The Prospects of Mutual Accountability in South-South Cooperation¹

“The buck stops here.”
- *Harry S. Truman* -

I. Introduction: The ‘Orphan’ Pillar in ‘Unlikely’ Settings

Historically, international development efforts have been focusing on traditional aid paradigms anchored in North-South development cooperation, and the recent request for mutual accountability for global development cooperation - despite the lack of an international consensus on the accountability mechanism - has also been mostly echoing the donor- driven demands for not only holding programme countries to account but also demonstrating to one’s own domestic constituencies the transparent and receptive management of development cooperation (Chandy and Kharas 2011; Kim 2009). The strategic value of accountability for development cooperation is reconsidered as an essential mechanism implementing development programmes for both North-South cooperation (NSC) and South-South cooperation (SSC), particularly under the contemporary changing development landscape.

The commitments of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) still remain unfulfilled, and the international aid community is now heading towards a new Post-2015 development era. The world economic crisis is

¹ The key findings of the study are based upon the field research on the issue of mutual accountability in SSC from November 2013 to March 2014, which mobilised in-depth interviews with 18 different aid agencies from the four Southeast Asian countries: Myanmar and Cambodia as recipient partners of SSC, and Vietnam and Indonesia as South-South providers.

eroding debt sustainability of developing countries, trade negotiations are stalemated with the waning of the World Trade Organization (WTO) system and fragmented into multiple free trade agreements, and equal access to affordable medicines and technology is patchy. The traditional donors of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are facing a serious economic downturn and its ensuing budget cutback of official development assistance (ODA). Against such an adverse backdrop, stronger development cooperation is necessarily required to accelerate progress of enabling environments inviting newly emerging aid providers of SSC into the framework of global partnership beyond the traditional pattern of NSC (Agarwal 2012). Another key part of building a global partnership for effective development is to introduce accountability mechanisms that make development partners more mutually accountable to each other, thereby reinforcing mutual trust and positive incentives to participate in a development partnership (Steets 2010).

The magnitude of SSC continues to receive high attention from the international aid community due to its complementary role in sustaining the current global architecture of international development (UNDP 2013). In particular, the 2008 High Level Forum (HLF) III in Accra endorsed the contributory function of SSC for the purpose of aid effectiveness, and the final round of HLF in Busan re-emphasized the important position of SSC as one of the key participants in the global partnership for effective development cooperation. United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's message for the United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation in September 2013 aptly confirms the importance of SSC by underlining that SSC offers real, concrete solutions to common development challenges by sharing best practices, funding pilot projects in far-flung locales, providing capital to scale up successful projects, supplying regional public goods, and developing and adapting appropriate technologies (UN 2013c). SSC offers concrete solutions to common development challenges, particularly in the context of developing countries that are turning to each other for lessons on innovative policies and schemes to address and share successful experiences of developing countries.² Indeed, more proper solutions are available across

the Global South, which, if adequately harnessed, could make meaningful contributions across a range of urgent concerns, from hunger and health to education and sustainable energy.

The domain of accountability, akin to SSC, obtains relatively recent considerations from academics and practitioners in the international aid community. In the 2005 HLF-II (Paris), mutual accountability (MA) was spotlighted as one of key principles for the Paris Declaration (PD) on aid effectiveness, and the Busan HLF in 2011 further reconfirmed its importance as one of the four major principles of the Busan Outcome Document (BoD). In addition, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's final report, "A Dignity of Life for All," to the 68th UN General Assembly highlighted the implementation function of MA in the processes of Post-2015 development agendas. It is a cliché to state that MA promotes an equal partnership between programme countries and providers of development cooperation, and should be a key means of ensuring compliance with the MDGs' eight commitments, including those agreed in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). However, there is no internationalized general consensus on the exact definition of MA and its entailing mechanisms to implement MA at both international and domestic levels.³ In particular, the accountability request in the process of aid transfers results in a double jeopardy to donors in the sense that they are required not only to demonstrate the transparent and accountable use of national levies for aid disbursements but also to hold recipient governments to be accountable for their commitments.

² It is fair to state that the importance of combining growth and special programmes to make a major impact on poverty is necessarily required in developing countries (Bhagwati 1966). China's emphasis on infrastructure in other developing countries has resulted in improvements in electricity supply, an increase in railway connections, and reduced prices for telecommunication services. India's National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme entitles each rural Indian household by law to 100 days of unskilled work per year on public works programmes. The Brazilian *Bolsa Familia* programme, a cash transfer model, has helped improve childhood nutrition and education in Brazil, and the system has been successfully transplanted into Africa.

³ According to the UNDCF's Definition of MA, "mutual accountability is defined as accountability between the providers and recipients of development cooperation, for the effectiveness of that cooperation in producing development results" (UNDCF 2012: i).

Indeed, linking MA with the unusual landscapes of SSC is a task of hard graft for two main reasons. In the first place, the notion of MA *per se*, despite its simplification and straightforwardness, remains to be slippery with its conceptual loopholes that lack sophisticated components consisting of MA, whereas notable gains have undoubtedly been made in a subsequent series of international meetings in Paris and Busan. Translating the simple idea of MA into international aid practices has not been easy, particularly in terms of the scope of the principle - accountability to whom and for what? - between donors and partners. Compared with the other four principles of the PD, measuring process of MA has not been firmly cemented as a mature stepping stone to enhance aid effectiveness. It is in this regard that MA has been cynically treated as the 'orphan pillar' of the PD (Egan 2008; OPM/ IDL 2008). Such an orphan field in which MA is not put properly in practice by the North-South development cooperation is even further problematic in locating its explanatory power in the context of SSC.

In the second place, the demand for institutional constraints to hold SSC partners to be mutually accountable to each other implies that public accountability can be converted into a political issue by calling into question how one programme partner holds the other partner to account (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2005; Fox 2007). Embedding mutual accountability into the barren soil of SSC often remains as an inherently contested, politically misleading, and practically ineffectual process. Given that SSC is constituted on the virtue of mutual benefit and the recognition of reciprocity among programme partners, the request of MA, by all accounts, becomes a sensitive issue which drives them into the arena of conflict over whether and how those in power are held publicly responsible for their commitments, as both principals and agencies become actors taking dual roles of account-holder and accountor simultaneously. Accountability politics in SSC involves challenging who is accountable to whom, thereby exploring the rugged landscapes of power and voice in the terrain of international development cooperation (Weisband and Ebrahim 2007; Grant and Keohane 2005). Accordingly, translating MA into the unlikely settings of SSC would be a grim task.

It is within undeniable bounds to state that genuine scholarly research has seldom been done in this unexplored field of the MA-SSC nexus.⁴ Notwithstanding, it is high time for us to understand better the impacts and effectiveness of MA, particularly in the unlikely context of SSC. Most of all, accountability deficits in practices have been a central problem in political economy that donors must take very seriously when they design and implement aid programmes in partner countries. Accountability ultimately matters to poor peoples, simply because poorly designed programmes can undermine accountability, and the lack of accountability results in disempowering the poor and depriving them of political opportunities in holding aid agencies to account (DFID 2008). SSC hardly takes exception to such a need of democratic accountability. Secondly, it is necessary for all partners to redouble their efforts to harness the wealth of knowledge, expertise, and development thinking of the Global South in the frame of MA. The fundamental goal of accountability mechanisms involves behavioural changes of development partners in a way of enhancing mutual understanding and incorporating different sets of aid policies into a mutually predictable form of institutions to reduce the probability of buck-passing. Last but not least, the nice graft of MA onto SSC becomes a critical platform to undergird the positive linkage between the Post-Busan process and the Post-2015 development agenda process. Both processes have been emphasising the significance of accountability mechanisms as well as the rise of the Global South, but they have not yet begun to discuss how to marry MA with SSC in a systematic fashion. It is important to note that global demands for accountable development cooperation need to be high on the Post-2015 development agenda.

In a nutshell, this study is undertaken to fill in an explanatory vacuum at the intersection of SSC and MA by dealing with the following questions: why is the integral juxtaposition of MA and SSC required?; how can the seeds of accountability ever grow in unlikely environments embedded in SSC?; and is

⁴ Scholarly research papers on this issue are one of the rarest in the field of development studies. As a policy paper, refer to AusAID's research document, "South East Asia Joint Initiative on Mutual Accountability" (2007).

the modification of MA necessarily required to make it fit in social and political contexts of SSC? On top of these, this study is aimed to provide a *conceptual* and *theoretical* overview of how accountability fits into the domain of SSC. The focal point of this research involves a scholarly scrutiny of the mutual construction via the interaction between the Western concept of accountability and the local realities of programme countries in order to see whether it impacts the actual conceptualisation for varying social contexts of SSC and its links to the internationalisation of global accountability.⁵ Accountability is viewed as a normative condition for the effective implementation of aid programmes, and the point of analysis is, therefore, put on the institutional transfers of accountability by seeing not only how many of the Western principles are locally present or demanded but also how the norm emerges and is accepted and institutionalised in the local settings of programme countries (Mawdsley 2012). Given that the Global South has been keen to the issue of dependencies upon aid packages from the North, imposing MA mechanisms without modification - in terms of national variances of programme countries - results in weighing down on counterparts in the South. In view of this, we propose 'soft' accountability as a new alternative concept of MA, suitable for SSC's unlikely settings.

In identifying soft accountability for SSC, this study proceeds in four steps. First, it starts by describing MA in the developmental context and reviewing the historical evolution of SSC as analytical backdrops for the premise that MA remains opaque to illustrate its effective functions in the context of SSC. Second, it seeks to translate MA in SSC by not only classifying three components of MA (responsibility, answerability, and enforceability) but also making modalities of MA in different situations of SSC. Third, it seeks to assess and make recommendations on the ways and means of mainstreaming MA in the context of SSC by addressing relevant components of MA which can be taken into consideration as institutional and sustainable development

⁵ The fields of aid and development cooperation are suffused with imaginary discourses and symbolic paradigms, expressed and forged through documentations, meetings, and practices (Mawdsley 2012: 145). The social constructivist theory suggests that states intentionally and unintentionally project particular identities via their development cooperation policies and symbolisms (Katzenstein 1996).

platforms for SSC. It is also stressed that another way of reinforcing the centrality of accountability in practices of SSC can be achieved by relating national MA with international MA within the frame of SSC. Lastly, the concluding remark contains the limits and suggestions with regards to prospects of soft accountability by way of both local adaptations of accountability mechanisms and the initiation in launching a new 'global accountability initiative' for SSC which leads to the successful transition from the Busan Global Partnership (BGP) to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the Post-2015 development epoch.

II. The Stunted Evolution of Mutual Accountability in the Development Context

In national settings, the definition of accountability has relatively established a consensus in the academic disciplines of social sciences (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2005: 3):

“Accountability refers to the fact that decision-makers do not enjoy unlimited autonomy but have to justify their actions vis-à-vis affected parties, that is, stakeholders. These stakeholders must be able to evaluate the actions of the decision-makers and to sanction them if their performance is poor, for instance by removing them from their positions of authority. Thus, effective accountability requires mechanisms for steady and reliable information and communication between decision-makers and stakeholders as well as mechanisms for imposing penalties.”

The accountability mechanism in the domestic terrain, therefore, requires three institutional components to hold political elites to account: 1) democratic voting or appoint mechanisms; 2) evaluation processes; and 3) withdrawal of political support, and shaming and physical sanctions (March and Olsen 1995; Keohane 2002). However, in most areas of global governance, different forms of accountability co-exist in an incomplete form. Most of all, lack of centralised public authorities hampers global stakeholders’ ability to call upon MA to be operated in democratic and transparent fashions. Particularly, when it comes to mutually accountable mechanisms, the purview of account-holders and duty-bears becomes much more complicated, and the exact location of responsibility becomes quite blurred.

The provision of aid has been increasingly under scrutiny with increasing demands for accountable results since the PD of 2005 internationally endorsed MA as one of the five key principles for aid effectiveness. The accountability mechanism to implement MA between donors and partner countries is marked as a critical foundation for institutionalising development

partnerships in a harmonised and aligned fashion. Despite the growing consensus on the significance of MA, the definitional contestation of accountability hampered its semantic and institutional consolidations on rocky roads.

From Paris to Busan

Upon the creation of the five principles and twelve indicators of the PD in 2005, it has been said that MA and the transparency issue are “essential elements for development results” (§24 of the Accra Agenda for Action). Since the PD, both donors and partner countries have been required to “hold one another accountable for the commitments they have voluntarily made to one another” (Jones and Picanyol 2011: 3). According to the PD, MA can be enhanced by committing to “jointly assess through existing and increasingly objective country level mechanisms mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, including the Partnership Commitments” as Indicator 12 of the PD shows. However, the implementation result of the MA principle was far from the target, even though there was progress made to some extent. By the end of 2010, only 38 percent of developing countries introduced the mutual review process. Among them, only 32 percent of sub-Saharan African countries established MA mechanisms, while about 60 percent of Asia and the Pacific countries implemented MA mechanisms (OECD 2011a: 91). In consequence, MA has been considered as an ‘orphan pillar’ amongst the five Paris principles (Droop *et al.* 2008: 4; Egan 2008).

During the Accra meeting in 2008, it was particularly emphasised that both donors and developing partners are accountable to their domestic constituents (Steer *et al.* 2009). In particular, it was highlighted that the weak accountability mechanism at the country level in relation with the lack of transparency and access to information tended to hinder positive development results (Domingo *et al.* 2009). There seemed to be a consideration of transparency as a ‘basic expression of MA’ (Kharas 2011: 237). However, in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), the construction of the Paris MA

indicator remained the same (Jones and Picanyol 2011): as shown in the PD, it was considered to have a MA mechanism if a country conducted a mutual review process by meeting the three aspects of aid policy or strategy, country level aid effectiveness targets, and broad-based dialogue, possibly inspired by the Oxford Policy Management (OPM)'s three mechanisms of MA, such as independent third-party reviews, peer reviews, and mutual reviews (Kharas 2011; OECD 2011a).

Furthermore, the fundamental approach to MA remains unchanged in the BGP, also known as GPEDC. The only change made is an expansion of the considering criteria for the mutual assessment review as at least four of the five criteria should be met. The BGP agreed in 2012 set out five criteria for the mutual assessment review in a country as: 1) existence of an aid or partnership policy that defines a country's development cooperation priorities, 2) existence of country- level targets for effective development cooperation for both the developing country's government and the providers of development cooperation, 3) assessment against these targets undertaken jointly by the government and providers at the senior level in the past two years, 4) active involvement of the local governments and non-executive stakeholders in such reviews, and 5) comprehensive results of such exercises are made public (see UNDP/ OECD 2013: 22).

However, as mentioned above, the MA mechanism has still not been fully implemented, and the main reason why development partners fell behind the MA target of the PD was due to the lack of clear understanding (Egan 2008). Although the Paris and Accra agreements have gradually broadened understanding of MA and have slowly changed aid stakeholders' behaviour to be accountable to each other as well as against taxpayers (OECD 2011a), MA still seems to be an emerging agenda, and it needs to be further developed in order to achieve a concrete understanding amongst aid stakeholders (Steer *et al.* 2009). While implementing the BGP indicators, the concept of MA remains unclear as there has been no further discussion in enhancing the MA mechanisms since the HLF-II in Paris. Furthermore, compared to the HLF-II and the HLF-III, BGP's MA mechanism requires

more complexity as it lies on a multi-stakeholder development cooperation architecture.

At the same time, another reason for disappointing implementation results of the MA principle could be due to ‘no single over-arching authority to monitor behaviour and compel corrections’ for stakeholders (Droop *et al.* 2008: 18). In particular, donors were not willing to accept the enforcement mechanism for poor performance (Jones and Picanyol 2011). Given that the MA mechanisms can properly function when satisfying the three key determinants of the availability and use of information, mechanisms for monitoring performance, and existence of adequate incentives for compliance (De Renzio and Mulley 2006), the Paris principle of MA only satisfies monitoring mechanisms. Besides, the MA principle has not been fully adapted amongst development partners at the country level, even though the evidence lies in anecdotal records from aid workers in countries. In the fragile context, capacity at the country level is even scarce in terms of supporting the MA system, despite there being a broad consensus of the importance of the government development strategy between partners for strengthening the MA structure (OPM/IDL 2008).

In the light of this, a transparency mechanism within the context of data availability has been emphasised further, and thus, the BGP has presented transparency as a sole indicator (Indicator 4) apart from the MA indicator (Indicator 7). This change was initialised on the basis of the rationale that one of the most important building blocks for enhancing the MA mechanisms is to achieve greater transparency in using development resources. However, the change made in the BGP has not clearly addressed the gaps between transparency and MA; as Kharas (2011: 237) noted, “transparency in the future should be driven by the needs of MA processes.”

Beyond Busan: Towards the Post-2015 Development Framework

While the BGP separately provides transparency and accountability indicators, those two concepts seem to be re-married under accountability

agenda in the post-2015 development framework setting process. For example, after the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (HLP) called for the need for ‘data revolution’ in order to reinforcing transparency (UN 2013b), the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) has enlarged the concept by coining the term ‘accountability revolution’ in order to establish “data- enabled national, regional and international frameworks for monitoring and accountability of development delivery” (UN 2014). At the same time, the UN Secretary-General highlighted the importance of robust accountability mechanisms for all stakeholders in the implementation process of the future global goals in order to achieve a SDG (UN 2013a).

The urge for the change of mind-set from data revolution to accountability revolution stems from the rationale that transparency is not enough to be accountable for development results even though the HLP enlightened the importance of data (Haddad 2013). According to Haddad (2013), considering data revolution is indeed an improvement; however we need to focus more on the “capacity to hold the duty bearer to account and to deliver the duty,” which means ‘accountability.’ This is why we need an accountability revolution. Furthermore, more engagement from the bottom level in the public management, such as citizens’ participation, can be also a useful driver to achieve accountability revolution in the Post-2015 development era (IDEA 2013).

III. South-South Cooperation at the Crossroads

We now turn to briefly review the historical evolution of SSC from the Bandung Conference to the political landscape of contemporary SSC. A brief touch on the impact of MA in the context of SSC is also conducted for the further discussion on the understanding of soft accountability.

Definition and History of South-South Cooperation

The birth of SSC can be found in the Bandung Conference in 1955 as an effort to promote economic and cultural cooperation between the Global South, and the official strategic framework for SSC was initiated by the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) in the form of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPOA) in 1978 (UN 2010, 2011). In 2003, the TCDC was renamed as the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU-SSC) as the importance of SSC was recognised with rapid rise of the Global South (UN 2011).

With the creation of the Group of 77 (G77) in 1964, cooperation within the SSC domain is often referred to as the cooperation between G77 members and China (Tejasvi 2007; UN 2010, 2011). The G77 is a formal cooperation forum by the Global South under the UN context, and has continuously adopted milestones of international efforts which can enhance SSC, such as the Charter of Algiers in 1967, BAPOA in 1978, Caracas Declaration in 1989, First South Summit in Havana in 2000, first SSC conference on science and technology in Dubai in 2002, and Second Summit in Doha in 2005. Besides the G77, the G33 in the WTO and the G24 in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have also played roles of driving SSC in the international cooperation and collaboration (Bilal 2012; UN 2003). At the same time, the establishment of the United National Development Programme (UNDP) in 1966 was also taken as the “first of significant signs showing strong South-South collaboration” (Tejasvi 2007; UN 2011: 6).

In the light of this, the original definition of SSC was built upon political, economic, and social exchanges, including trade, investment, and technology

among Southern partners, the private sector, and civil society organisations (CSOs) (UN 2010, 2011). However, when the third Organisation for OECD DAC HLF was held in Accra, Ghana, in 2008, SSC within the development cooperation regime was re-defined by focusing on South-South peer learning and knowledge sharing as a way to solve ‘common’ development challenges (OECD 2008; Tejasvi 2007). This change reflects ‘horizontal partnerships’ of SSC spirit articulated with equity, trust, mutual benefit, and flexibility (TT-SSC, unknown). At the same time, considering the types of SSC, it can also be defined as “concessional loans and grants, including technical cooperation, provided for development purposes” (UN 2010: 71). In comparison, triangular cooperation can be understood as “a partnership between DAC donors and providers of SSC to implement development cooperation projects in beneficiary countries” (Langendorf 2012: 25-26). According to the UNDP, triangular cooperation can be defined as “a way of fostering development by leveraging the best features of cooperation between developing countries with assistance from developed countries” (Langendorf 2012: 27). Some key distinctions of the symbolic claims for aid policies between Western donors and Southern development cooperation partners are laid out for comparison in the following Table 1.

Table 1. The Symbolic Claims of Western Donors and Southern Development Cooperation Partners

Western donors	Southern development cooperation partners
· Charity · Moral obligation to the unfortunate · Expertise based on superior knowledge, institutions, science and technology · Sympathy for different and distant others · The virtue of suspended obligation, a lack of reciprocation	· Opportunity · Solidarity with other Third World countries · Expertise based on direct experience of pursuing development in poor-country circumstances · Empathy based on a shared identity and experience · The virtue of mutual benefit and the recognition of reciprocity

Source: Mawdsley (2012: 153).

Mutual Accountability as a Critical Limit of South-South Cooperation

SSC has faced challenges, such as the lack of capacity for appropriate monitoring and evaluation, managing quality data, and improving transparency (Bilal 2012; UN 2011; TT-SSC unknown). As such, these limitations have led the weak MA systems in countries. Accordingly, there have been demands for SSC to learn from NSC in stimulating transparency and MA (TT-SSC, unknown). For example, the AAA clearly encouraged all development partners, including South-South cooperation actors, to adapt the principles of the PD, including MA (§19 of the AAA). In other words, SSC partners need to adapt and enrich aid effectiveness principles in order to play a complementary role against the traditional NSC (§19e of the AAA). The efforts made during the Accra meeting continued in the Busan meeting in 2011 by traditional donors to call for broader engagement of Southern partners in effective development cooperation agendas. Based on this, the implementation of the ten indicators as well as the four main principles of the BoD remain as a voluntary code of conduct (Bilal 2012; also see OECD 2011b). However, it is noteworthy that some South-South providers still consider the Busan agreement as a strong push from the traditional donors, and tend to prefer more neutral mechanisms, such as the G20 (Bilal 2012; Li 2013).

In spite of the dearth of robust MA mechanisms operating in SSC, the UN and international aid communities, as the Marrakech Declaration on SSC highlighted in 2003, recognized that SSC is not an option but an imperative to complement NSC in order to contribute to the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the MDGs (UN 2003). SSC is about the force of solidarity and mutual benefit, with which international aid communities can overcome even the biggest challenges in the wake of the financial crisis and economic downturns in traditional donor states. Meanwhile, UN agencies agreed on the importance of tracking, monitoring and evaluating, and mainstreaming activities on SSC in the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Such a consensus on the need for accountability mechanisms in SSC with even an embryonic form

was balanced out by another consensus noting that MA for SSC must be demand-driven and implemented in accordance with national priorities. As an alternative method to share the MA mechanism among SSC partners, donor agencies generally seem to agree on the implementation of SSC at the regional and sub-regional levels through regional coordination arrangements (Goetz and Jenkins 2005; Gaventa and McGee 2013). By contrast, the Southern partner countries seem to have great concerns about the risk of MA in the sense of the North's initiative and dominance in shaping normative ideas of MA and its risks in abusing power rather than regulating power-holders (Rhee 2011). Thus, the point of analysis needs to depart from the critical mix of positive aid impacts of SSC and limited functions of MA to SSC, or in other words, determine to what extent SSC's important presence in the global aid architecture can override the request of MA mechanisms from the international donor community.

IV. Translating Mutual Accountability into South-South Cooperation

OECD DAC donors' formulation of mutual accountability has a particular set of mechanisms, despite still lacking clear systemic implementation mechanisms, with both challenges and advances for development cooperation between the North and the South. In this regard, it should not be simply translated and applied as 'the universal model' for middle/low-income countries engaged in SSC. This experience is not only highly diverse and complex but also becomes easily politicized on the basis of a North-South dichotomy and donor-recipient paradigm. It is essential that SSC engaged mutual accountability in ways that take account of the articulated principles and approaches of SSC, such as strengthening capacities for self-development, implementing principles of country ownership, equality and mutual benefit, and adjusting the development experience of the SSC aid-provider to actual conditions in partner countries.

The process of translating MA in the distinctive terrain of SSC is a necessary condition to mainstream accountability mechanisms in preparing the GPEDC towards the Post-2015 development procedures, and two paralleling translation processes are required. First, some distinctive characteristics of SSC are taken into consideration: conventionally weak domestic demands for holding governmental implementers accountable to their commitments; and long historical legacies of SSC on the basis of trust building and mutual benefits, in accordance with non-intervention of sovereign issues. The calibre of MA in SSC needs to be recrystallized in the terrain of intergovernmental relations of SSC, rather than in domestic dimensions of the principal-agent relationship. SSC and its aid relations are difficult to value on a comparable basis across countries involved in development aid programmes. It is thus critical to see whether cultural relativity impacts the exportation of accountability and results in successful acceptance, hybrid accountability or voluntary accountability (Leat 1990).

Second, there are some key lessons from DAC donor practices which

countries involved in SSC may find relevant as they develop their own path of mutual accountability mechanisms, even though SSC is necessarily treated as a different contextual entity. At the national level, accountability is a political issue between the state and civil society in the sense that it is how 'the governed' hold 'the governors' to account (Mulgan 2005; Fox 2005; Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2005). Problems of capture and bias mean that both formal and informal systems of accountability unfairly exclude vulnerable groups, including women, and reinforce inequality. On the other hand, 'accountability politics' can be applied to the principal-agent relationship between aid-giving countries and programme countries. Accountable delivery of development cooperation efforts is critical to improve its quality and effectiveness in achieving better development results. It is a central problem in political economy and one that donors must take very seriously as poorly designed programmes can undermine accountability. Campaigns for public accountability often win limited concessions at best but they can leave cracks in the system that serve as handholds for subsequent efforts to open up powerful authorities to public scrutiny. Focusing on accountability in the arena of SSC may thus be controversial, because it concerns the nature of the political settlement.

In this sense, it is critical to understand how the existing conceptualisation of MA can be reformulated in the unusual context of SSC. The generic term of MA holds the notion that "programme partners and all other development cooperation actors are called to be accountable for the effectiveness of development cooperation, but they all need to make accountability more mutual, by making providers more accountable to programme country governments, and providers and programme country governments more accountable to intended beneficiaries of development cooperation and taxpayers in provider countries" (UNDCF 2012). Given that this notion provides a definitional contents but still too broad to be relevantly modified to the context of SSC, MA needs to be more sophisticatedly reconceptualised by the partition of its three conceptual components - responsibility, answerability, and enforcement - for the sake of more rigorous analysis.

Conceptual Components of Mutual Accountability

(1) Responsibility

Responsibility is referred as to an essential component of accountability in the sense that those in positions of authority have clearly defined duties and performance standards, enabling their behaviours to be assessed transparently and objectively (UN 2013c).

Accountability makes it possible to delineate the respective responsibilities of different actors in the development process. If international development commitments are framed in terms of the development responsibilities underpinning them, accountability for the goals becomes a matter of legal obligation, rather than charity or discretion. Clear identification of who is responsible for which commitments at the initial stage of aid programmes contributes to avoiding the confusion on the issue of who is the partner that can hold the other partners to account for particular activities throughout the implementation and evaluation process of aid programmes. As seen below, there are varieties of methods to be mobilised to clarify where responsibilities lie among programme partners involved: policy dialogues, MoU, safeguards,⁶ due diligence programmes,⁷ and so forth.

- Policy dialogues, trust-building processes, etc.
- Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
- Safeguards (ADB, World Bank)
- Due diligence programme (AusAID)

⁶ ADB (2013), just like the World Bank, screens all proposed projects to determine their potential environmental and social impacts by setting up three major safeguard categories which are the fundamental clauses to be complied with by both ADB and partner countries. ADB's safeguards include environmental impacts, involuntary resettlement, and the rights of indigenous peoples. At the least, these three safeguards have very accurate identifications of where responsibilities lie.

⁷ In 2013, AusAid introduced the Due Diligence Framework (DDF) whose concept is to involve an investigation of a person or public authorities prior to signing a contract, or an act with a certain standard of care. It can be a legal obligation, but the term will more commonly apply to voluntary investigations. A common example of due diligence in various industries is the process through which a potential acquirer evaluates a target company or its assets for an acquisition. Refer to <http://aid.dfat.gov.au/civilsociety/Documents/consultation-draft-cso-dd-assessment-standards.pdf>

(2) Answerability

The dimension of answerability requires that public officials and institutions provide reasoned justifications for their actions and decisions to those they affect, including the public at large, voters who invest public officials with authority, and institutions mandated to provide oversight. In the context of development, the relationship of power between individuals and state institutions, between providers of aid and the programme partners who use it is often an asymmetrical one (Newell and Bellour 2002). Enhancing transparencies for informational sharing transforms these asymmetries by recasting the relationship in terms of duty bearers and rights holders, empowering individuals (partner countries) to control the behaviour of public institutions (the other partners) as a matter of entitlement, and promoting the quality of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) by use of symmetrically shared information. Accordingly, the concept of accountability is necessarily put on a more comprehensive terrain than transparency, because answerability is rather equivalent with transparency in practical terms. The methods of answerability include the following items:

- Database sharing, information sharing
- South-South learning effects on aid information
- M&E, peer review
- Development Assistance Database (DAD), data revolution
- Transparency

(3) Enforceability

Enforceability requires public institutions to put mechanisms in place that monitor the degree to which public officials and institutions comply with established standards, impose sanctions on officials who do not comply, and ensure that appropriate corrective and remedial action is taken when required. Enforcing accountability is not only concerned with penalties, but is about ensuring fair and systematic mechanisms are in place to assess

compliance by partner countries with agreed standards of responsibility. In this sense, the introduction of enforcement mechanisms is regarded as the last resort for one partner to call other partner countries to be accountable through either inspection mechanisms, for instance the Inspection Panel of the World Bank,⁸ or the rigorous oversight of progress, such as the Compliance Review mechanism of the Asian Development Bank (ADB).⁹

- Inspectional Panel (World Bank)
- Compliance Review Panel (ADB and other regional development banks)
- Other resettlement processes

All in all, the prototype of MA requires all three elements to be organically interconnected with each other: agreed standards to assign the responsibilities, transparent transfers of information, and established corrective actions against misbehaviours of public agencies. The Principal-Agent theory rephrases this by stating that principals must be able to evaluate the actions of the agencies and to sanction them if their performance is poor, for instance, by removing them from their positions of authority (Miller 2005). Thus, effective accountability requires mechanisms for steady and reliable information and communication between stakeholders as well as mechanisms for imposing penalties when required (March and Olsen 1995; Keohane and Nye 2000).

⁸ The Inspection Panel is an independent accountability mechanism of the World Bank, established in September 1993 and starting operations on 1 August 1994. The Panel provides a forum for people who believe that they may be adversely affected by Bank-financed operations to bring their concerns to the highest decision-making levels of the World Bank. The Panel determines whether the Bank is complying with its own policies and procedures, which are designed to ensure that Bank-financed operations provide social and environmental benefits and avoid harm to people and the environment. See Shihata (2000).

⁹ ADB's Compliance Review Panel was established as one of components of its institutional reforms to strengthen accountability (ADB 2013). The review of the Accountability Mechanism policy by a Board Management working group began in 2011 and was concluded in February 2012. The 2012 Accountability Mechanism policy became effective on 24 May 2012 and has resulted in clearer and closer collaboration between the functions of problem solving and compliance review.

However, either international aid agencies or traditional donors, which meet these three conditions of MA, are very rare. Indeed, it is not easy task to satisfy all of them simultaneously by trying to be more open and attentive to serious complaints arising during programme implementation, adapting changing needs throughout the programme cycle, and complying with inspection results of punishments. Particularly, the dimension of enforceability is the most burdensome component to be applied to the case of NSC, simply because traditional donors are reluctant to adopt the enforcement mechanism that may hold back their strategic maneuverers. Even SSC partners are more likely to perceive all three components as a kind of threats or organised shackles by which traditional donors control the behaviour of partner countries. Therefore, the three components of MA need to be winnowed out by characterising the horizontality of South-South development cooperation (see Chapter 5).

Modalities of Mutual Accountability in South-South Cooperation

Another way of translating MA for SSC is to calculate the number of cases which can occur in the different combinations of related factors to both SSC and MA. As Richard Mulgan (2005: 190) aptly asserts, accountability for collective action gives rise to a recurring problem of whether accountability should be concentrated or diffused. In accordance with the number of actors involved and the profile of development cooperation programmes, the practical modalities of MA and the degree of buck-passing (or accountability sharing) will be envisaged in varying ways. As illustrates, the dimension that is used for a conceptual typology of the MA-SSC nexus is two-fold: (i) the number of actors (bilateral vs. plural), and (ii) the patterns of SSC (technical cooperation vs. turnkey projects). Then, the two-by-two matrix demonstrates four possible scenarios of SSC by crosschecking the number of actors and patterns of SSC.

Figure 1. Actors and Modalities of South-South Cooperation

	Bilateral Cooperation	Multilateral Cooperation
Technical Cooperation	Trust Building	Ad hoc Buck-passing
Infrastructure/ Turnkey Projects	Strategic Alliance	Intended Buck-passing

In most cases of SSC, the pattern of development cooperation, regardless of the number of actors, partakes of technical cooperation (TC) aimed to promote mutual trust, self-sustained cooperation, and solidarity, rather than infrastructure-centred and turnkey projects (see Appendix I, II).¹⁰ The main reason for this observation results from the nature of TC whose programmes cover a wide range of low cost schemes, such as technology transfers, knowledge sharing and exchange, co-research projects, training programmes, workshops and conferences, and human networking. TC takes advantages of operational flexibilities and low costs in terms of time management, the number of participants, and the density of legal constraints. Therefore, enhancing the capacities of partner countries is taken into account as a critical measure for consolidating MA of SSC. On the other hand, SSC actors, irrespective of how many actors are involved, are prone to shirk financial responsibilities for high-cost investments when it comes to turnkey projects requiring the rigid relationship with programme partners.

Likewise, the actor-based approach to modalities of SSC generates another interesting points: the presence of two actors only in a particular set of SSC, no matter what they opt for, creates lower possibilities of buck-passing, whereas multiple stakeholders tend to pass the bucks to other partners due to endogenous difficulties in clarifying where responsibilities lie evidently among the multiple number of actors (Ruland 2011). This phenomenon is

¹⁰ We collected all case studies of SSC which are done by the TT-SSC, and sorted them out in accordance with the two-by-two frame in the above. The full results of the collected cases are appended to this paper. All data can be reached at www.southsouthcases.info.

quite a natural process, from the perspective of the rational-choice institutionalism, because the plural number of actors, under the dearth of accountability mechanisms, fail to overcome the perverse incentives of actors that prevent collective- action problems from being solved (Gibson *et al.* 2007; Ostrom 1990; Buchanan 1977). It is in this regard that J. S. Mill (1861[1974]: 332) classically stated the importance of a single point of accountability under multiple actors as follows:

“As a general rule, every executive function, whether superior or subordinate, should be the appointed duty of some given individual. It should be apparent to all the world who did everything, and through whose fault anything was left undone. Responsibility is null and void when nobody knows who is responsible. Nor, even when real, can it be divided without being weakened. To maintain it at its highest, there must be one person who receives the whole praise of what is well done, the whole blame of what is ill.”

In the first category of the actor-modality matrix (Figure 1) in which only two actors intend to carry out a set of TC, the relational pattern of the actors' behaviours will boil down to the form of 'trust building.' The purpose of TC, which the two SSC actors pursue in the form of ad hoc meetings for training courses for instance, does not require high cost inputs of financial sources but intends to enrich mutual benefits by exchanging official staffs and CSOs. The type of trust building, thus, does not have to call upon the two actors to be accountable for their performance in a very strict fashion, mainly because the bucks each actor needs to take responsible for are not heavy or even unclear. This pattern seems to be taken normally by the initial stage of consolidating mutual trust between two SSC actors. The following two cases in Table 2 can be categorized as trust building (see Appendix I, II).

Table 2. Cases of Bilateral Cooperation and TC in SSC

* Typology / 1: TC-B, 2: TC-M, 3: Infra-B, 4: Infra-M

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
Argentina-Bangladesh – Water management for water and food security	Argentina	Bangladesh	TC	Partnership, mutual trust, self-sustained cooperation, KS, research	-	1	SSC
Cuba-Egypt – Joint Manufacturing on Vaccines	Cuba	Egypt	TC	Technology transfer & joint production	Challenges: Delays on the Egyptian side caused by registration impediments and in responses by the Cuban side have led to extension of the various phases of implementing this initiative	1	SSC
Thailand ACMECS-Human resources development	TICA	CLMV (bilateral projects only)	TC	Training, scholarship, expert dispatch, partnership	ACMECS Summit to ministerial meeting every two years, review every two years, sector working group for monitoring	1	SSC

Table 3. Cases of Multiple Actors and TC in SSC

* Typology / 1: TC-B, 2: TC-M, 3: Infra-B, 4: Infra-M

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1-4)	Categorisation
Barefoot College – Boosting rural solar energy	Barefoot college (multi-donor funding)	Multiple countries	TC	Training, local CSOs participation, partnership	-	2	SSC
Capacity Development for Development effectiveness (CDDE) Facility	CDDE Facility	Multiple countries	TC	Knowledge sharing	Assessments of the Paris Declaration, AIMS	2	SSC
China-IPRCC as a platform for SSC	IPRCC	Regions	TC	Research, knowledge sharing, training, exchange	Policy dialogue	2	SSC
ITEC India-Indian expertise for sustainable development	India	Multiple countries	TC	Training	-	2	SSC
Cuba-Africa – Promoting integrated health services	Cuba (partially multi-donor funding)	Multiple countries	TC	Expert dispatch	-	2	SSC
IBSA-Guinea Bissau – Boosting food self-sufficiency	IBSA	Guinea-Bissau	TC	Training	-	2	SSC
India-Pan-African e-network for medical services and human services	India	AU members	TC	Technology transfer, education	No requirement of MA, which leaves TCIL itself unmonitored, in its process of implementation	2	SSC
NEPAD – Promoting e-schools in Africa	NEPAD	APRM members	TC	E-school programme, partnership	M&E report	2	SSC

Similarly, in the second category where TC is operated by multiple partners of SSC, all actors involved, most commonly, tend to find a way of passing the buck to each other, on ad hoc basis, rather than in a routinized fashion. Without the mechanisms of MA, the attribute of multiplicity would prompt all actors to have perverse incentives of eschewing their own bucks, due to the absence of centralised authorities to regulate wilful behaviours of the actors. Nevertheless, the degree of buck-passing in the case of TC will be no greater than that of infrastructure/investment, in that TC *per se* does not require a large scale of development financing, takes the off-the-cuff operational patterns in many cases, and creates hardly the high value of bucks. The introduction of MA to this categorisation would be the best solution to not only institutionalize and consolidate a long-term sustainability of SSC, but minimize the probability of collective action problems. It is no doubt that as the eight cases in Table 3 show, actors in the Global South tend to single out this second category as the top priority of their options, compared to the other categorisations (also see Appendix I, II).

The third category composed of two actors and infrastructure-based cooperation will produce the relational pattern of ‘strategic alliance’ with the low profile of accountability mechanisms. Given the fact that there are only two players and the South-South provider decides to assist high-cost investment project at the expense of its national assets, it is highly plausible to assume that the South-South provider possesses strategic concerns and geopolitical proximity to support the targeted partner with the aim of holding the partner to be in favour of its strategic position. Instead, the provider needs to embark upon accountability mechanisms at least to ask the partner country to submit periodic reports, systematize information sharing, and fulfil the conditions of coordination meetings and M&E. We collect three cases from Appendix I and II, all of which illustrate Egypt’s strategic moves on to its neighbouring fragile countries such as South Sudan and Uganda (see Table 4).

Table 4. Cases of Bilateral Actors and Infrastructure Projects in SSC

* Typology / 1: TC-B, 2: TC-M, 3: Infra-B, 4: Infra-M

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
Generating electricity in South Sudan	Egypt	South Sudan	Infrastructure & TC	Construction, training, follow-up consultation	Periodic and final reports, information to all stakeholders	3	SSC
Egypt-South Sudan – Establishing two family medical units in South Sudan	Egypt	South Sudan	Infrastructure & TC	Construction, training	Coordination meetings, monitoring, environment study before commencement	3	SSC
Egypt-Uganda – Aquatic Weed Control	Egypt	Uganda	Infrastructure & investment	Construction, training	Challenges: Initial misperception, approval of tax exemptions, risk health hazards	3	SSC

The fourth pattern of SSC is found most clearly in situations such as multiple-actors' engagement in infrastructure or turnkey projects, in which a multiple number of SSC actors are able to play dual roles as providers or recipients by investing in a commonly targeted sector at either the regional level or specific country level. The assumption of no accountability mechanisms would end in the worst scenario of governance within which each actor's perverse incentive tends to override the urgency of common targets, thereby multiplying buck-passing. The replacement of monolithic links in bilateral cooperation with horizontal networks in multiple involvements will be doomed to severe damages on MA of SSC. Indeed, it

is not a plain process to delineate sharply not only who should be accountable but also to what degree the multiple stakeholders should be accountable for what (Zimmermann and Smith 2011). In consequence, this mode of SSC is most negatively conceived of being achieved in practical contexts, which is confirmed by just one case that we found from the case collection of the TT-SSC (see Table 5).

Table 5. Cases of Multiple Actors and Infrastructure Projects in SSC

* Typology / 1: TC-B, 2: TC-M, 3: Infra-B, 4: Infra-M

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
NEPAD – Investing in agriculture and food security in Africa	AU/CAADP/NEPAD (multi-donor trust fund)	Multiple countries	Infrastructure/ Investment & TC	-	African participating countries in the CAADP programme do recognize that accountability and efficient government are the necessary direction to be taken for economic prosperity of the continent, thus allowing themselves to be guided by development experts through CAADP.	4	SSC

In a nutshell, there are the two observations affecting commonly all four categorisations. First, the multiple-actor modality of SSC shows more inclinations to not only pass the buck to others but also find a way of

establishing even an initial stage of MA instead of bilateral development programmes. Second, the infrastructure/investment-based approach requiring high-cost inputs is equipped with much tighter mechanisms for accountability than TC-based cooperation. It is fair to argue that the combination of multiple actors and TC would be the best modality that SSC actors prefer to taking by reason of diluted requests for accountability as well as the possibility of buck-passing. Paradoxically, this modality will be forced to call upon all participants in SSC to account in a near future in order to sustain its long-term development. Sustainable and accountable development requires greater participation of aid recipients and other related partners. Such a shift implies a concomitant decline in a donor's authority over its own aid packages as well as a greater responsibility on behalf of the recipient. The shift also implies a new institutional constellation on both sides of the aid exchange, since sustainable development demands more attention to the long term.¹¹ Therefore, the call for the plantation of accountability mechanisms into the soil of SSC is a dead-end the Global South cannot avoid.


The translation of MA into SSC by the dissection of the four modalities culminates in how to make a clear-cut definition of 'soft' accountability, which is tailored for a new conceptual effort for the context of SSC in this paper. All things considered, soft accountability refers to a flexible conceptualization of accountability, designed to enhance its adaptability of SSC partners on the basis of their own distinctions of contextual environments, as well as varying degrees of capabilities in introducing accountability mechanisms to coordinate and regulate behaviours of SSC partners. Among the three components of MA discussed above, responsibility would be the main foundation and stepping stone of soft accountability in the context of SSC, and soft accountability is supposed to contain the next stages of MA, such as answerability and enforceability in due course of time and due process of institutional maturity.

¹¹ What is more questionable is the extension from the possibility of being called to account for actors' behaviours, to include its commitment to act responsibly in the absence of any external scrutiny, actual or potential (Mulgan 2003). When actors participating in SSC claim to be individually accountable to themselves or to their sense of duty, they do not so because they are unwilling to admit that they are in practice not accountable to any external authority or scrutiny (Day and Klein 1987).

V. Mainstreaming Accountability Mechanisms in South-South Cooperation

A further remaining task ahead is the extent of which component of MA, discussed above, is the first-order condition for the successful management operating SSC in an effective manner. Not by taking for granted the existing conceptualisation of MA, SSC needs to develop its own path of accountability mechanisms to prevent the other partners from abusing power and resources and enhance trust building and knowledge sharing for mutual benefits. It is thus important to note that mainstreaming MA into SSC implies the search of its distinctive trajectory by means of the reflection of the Western concept and practices of MA.

Figure 2. Spectrum of Mutual Accountability Mechanisms



Most of all, it is necessary to review how the three components of MA can be customized to the context of SSC. On the spectrum of time spans indicating the degree of maturity in implementing development cooperation programmes (see Figure 2), each element of MA - responsibility, answerability, and enforcement - is respectively positioned at different points

of time. Responsibility is undertaken as the major value and mechanism for loosen patterns of development cooperation at this initial stage. Answerability denotes a more matured accountability system than responsibility in the sense that all actors at this stage mutually hold each other to be accountable via mutual assessment, M&E, transparent information sharing and peer review. Enforcement is referred as to the last stage of MA in which actors are able to bring legal claims to the inspection panel or compliance review panels for the purpose of ex-post resettlement processes. However, all three components are not always mutually exclusive.

With the reflection of key implications as aforementioned, it is recognizable that the current level of institutional maturity in case of SSC retards its MA mechanism from being in tandem with answerability and enforceability. Starting from the domain of responsibility clarifying duty-bearer vis-à-vis rights-holder, SSC is able to identify its precise space and time under which MA can be institutionally consolidated. Ultimately, to mainstream MA for SSC involves the task of how to soften accountability mechanisms, rather than that of how to accommodate itself to the international standards of MA.

Another method to mainstream MA of SSC develops from institutional efforts to link national MA with international MA (UNDCF 2012). Developing countries, particularly in crisis and transition situations, will face strong challenges in relation to national-level MA that are much severer than traditional donors in financial crises. Strong national-level mutual accountability mechanisms have a major quantifiable impact on changing providers and programme countries' behaviours in the way they manage and deliver development cooperation. Therefore, the strong encouragement that both South-South providers and partner countries proactively participate in the formation of national-level MA mechanisms first is a silver bullet for mainstreaming MA in the unlikely context of SSC. In so doing, SSC actors keep on holding the dimension of responsibility as the basic platform; if excessively speedy in this process, for instance, in adopting enforcement mechanisms, they fail to maintain the sustainability of institutional reforms

in translating MA into their own contexts. On top of national MA, international- level accountability needs to be grafted.

According to UNDCF (2012), partner countries in the Global South needs to prepare the following contents:


- (1) An agreed national development cooperation policy (or strategy) document, covering all aspects of quality, driven by strong country leadership
- (2) Demand-driven frame, embedded in the strong ownership of programme countries
- (3) Locally-driven frameworks to monitor the quality and results of development cooperation, including specific annual performance targets for individual providers and the government, aligned to national development priorities
- (4) Annual analysis of progress towards these results by individual providers and programme country governments, and discussion at a national top-level meeting
- (5) Full participation of parliament and civil society organisations in mutual accountability, including use of their independent analytical inputs
- (6) Comprehensive and publicly accessible databases containing information on the quantity and quality of development cooperation

In general, making public agencies more accountable to the citizens they serve at the domestic level is a crucial block of building the effective statecraft that can deliver poverty reduction and basic welfare services (DFID 2008). Therefore, MA mechanisms at the national level are critical, given that accountability matters to poor people. Poverty persists in large part because poor people are disempowered and unable to hold others to be accountable for their performances (DFID 2008). In this sense, aid effectiveness depends upon aid programmes that strengthen, not undermine, domestic accountability, even though accountability relationships between the state and society in programme countries are affected and complicated by

multiple global factors, mainly external aid donors.

It is evident that the construction of national MA is a shortcut to secure the path of mainstreaming MA. National MA mechanisms enable programme countries to hold development cooperation providers accountable for their development cooperation, simultaneously being held accountable for development results and management of development cooperation. Greater clarity on an effective accountability mechanism contained in the global partnership for development and progress on minimum accountability standards and effective accountability mechanisms and dialogue forums at the country level will therefore be indispensable as international aid communities prepare to implement a Post-2015 development agenda. The ultimate goal of national MA mechanisms is to instil trust among all development actors and promote change in behaviour leading to improved aid quality. Furthermore, MA can help to make development financing more predictable, reduce use of parallel systems and project implementation units, encourage division of labour among providers, and promote the transparent use of development cooperation on the ground.

Figure 3. Linkages between National and International Mutual Accountability Mechanisms



However, there is a missing link in connecting national MA with international MA, which is required to complete the process of organic interconnectedness between them. Who is going to take the lead of this linkage? Strong global accountability frameworks call for the need for political leadership or centralised authorities in implementing coordinated outcomes from accountability dialogues by both programme countries and aid providers to promote behavioural changes at the global level and the decentralising process to fit national priorities as well (Kim 2011; Deacon 2007).

VI. Concluding Remarks: Practising Soft Accountability in South-South Cooperation

The accountability mechanism is at the centre of democratic governance. According to Francis Fukuyama (2011, 2014), the concrete development of political accountability is *de facto* a sweeping account of why some countries in the world failed to survive and some countries continued to prevail. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012), in a similar vein, argue that the economic success spurs and will be sustained when the government becomes accountable and responsive to citizens and the great mass of people in the country. In the domain of global governance, their scholarly accounts are not easily applied because of the absence of centralised enforcement authorities that regulate and coordinate varieties of national contexts in a single frame (Kim 2011). Moreover, SSC represents a separate zone from the traditional architecture of aid effectiveness and global governance. In this regard, forging MA in the unlikely settings of SSC adopts new alternative policies to stitch up rifts between the Global North and the Global South.

First, just like the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), MA is required to launch a new global accountability initiative, which is able to produce a general consensus on MA and its applications to SSC as well. As aforementioned, the fundamental problem in linking national MA with international MA comes from the negative aspect of global governance - the absence of world government. The launching of a global accountability initiative for SSC is a prompt rejoinder to the needs of the times for several reasons. To successfully implement the Post-2015 development agenda in the face of some economic and financial uncertainties will require greater focus on enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of development cooperation, including enhanced focus on achieving lasting development results. A renewed global partnership for development since the Busan HLF-IV in 2011 is required to place greater emphasis on strengthening accountability for commitments which are made at the global level. This emphasis can provide lessons for the design and implementation of a

Post-2015 development agenda by addressing itself in the context of adapting global and national development partnerships in view of achieving development goals on a sustainable basis. In short, the call for a new global initiative for MA is ultimately connected to the establishment of an institutional platform for action for systematic links between national MA and international MA.

Second, the major principles for MA in the field of SSC are required to develop further in order to consolidate the concept of ‘soft’ accountability. There are some essences for these principles:

- (1) Soft accountability should be voluntary based and self-disciplinary.
- (2) Soft accountability should be based upon demand-driven accountability mechanisms.
- (3) International MA platform is required to coordinate and customize different contexts of SSC partners.
- (4) Soft accountability should adopt the discourses of global partnership with the rectification and modification by which SSC partners are able to translate them into their own standards.

It is important to remember that the overemphasis of accountability is always counterproductive in terms of its negative impacts on the efficiency of aid projects (Wade 2009; Kim 2011). Introducing MA with no serious consideration of local conditions in partner countries fails to achieve its original goals of holding all participants to account; rather, it is more likely to undermine efficiency in exchange for enhancing accountability in an abused fashion. Accordingly, an incremental institutionalisation of MA via the softening process of how accountability mechanisms are realistically adapted to local culture and values would be the effective way of reducing the probability of abusing MA and reconciling the trade-off between accountability and efficiency.

Lastly, it is fair to stress that the three factors of CSOs, triangular cooperation, and private-sector involvement need to be considered further

important elements to complete the whole picture of the MA-SSC linkage. Poorly designed programmes can undermine accountability in both domestic and international relations with other actors involved in SSC. The construction of public accountability is driven by cycles of mutually reinforcing interaction between the thickening of civil society and state reformist initiatives, thereby promoting state-society synergy for calling power-holders to account. Also, including triangular cooperation and the private sector into the equation of SSC makes the MA-SSC link more complicated to identify the points of MA. Despite the growing complexity, bringing these factors back into the frame of linking national MA and international MA will result in more horizontal accountability by playing down hierarchical networks of vertical accountability.

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Appendix I. Case Summary: Asia Region

* Typology / 1: TC-B, 2: TC-M, 3: Infra-B, 4: Infra-M

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
Argentina-Bangladesh – Water management for water and food security	Argentina	Bangladesh	TC	Partnership, mutual trust, self-sustained cooperation, KS, research	-	1	SSC
AsDB – Asian-Pacific CoP on MfDR	AsCoP-MfDR (regional developing country network)	ADB member states	TC	SSC promotion	Mutual assessment	2	Unclear
AsDB Cambodia Vietnam – Twinning of Water Utilities	Cambodia (ADB twinning program)	Vietnam	TC ADB infrastructural investment loans fund possible if necessary	KS	-	1 or 3	Unclear
AsDB China India –Exchanging Development Experiences	China-India (ADB fund)	China-India	TC	KS, joint study	Steering committee	1	Neither SSC nor Triangular
AsDB PASO – Investing in aviation safety in the Pacific	PASO (Multiple or gsfunding)	Member states	TC	Network benefit, mutual cooperation	Overseeing regional aviation safety oversight, audits and inspections, regular review sessions of ADB	2	Unclear

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
ASER – Informing education policies with research	India (US Hewlett Foundation funding)	Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda	TC	Partnership	CSOs intervention	2	Triangular
Bangladesh -Korea – BRAD community development	Korea-Bangladesh (Korea funding)	Korea-Bangladesh	TC	Participatory approach, joint work	Implementation of MA	1	Not SSC (Korea)
Barefoot College – Boosting rural solar energy	Barefoot college (multi-donor funding)	Multiple countries	TC	Training, local CSOs participation, partnership	-	2	SSC
Capacity Development for Development Effectiveness (CDDE) Facility	CDDE Facility	Multiple countries	TC	KS	PD assessment, AIMS	2	SSC
China – IPRCC as a platform for South-South cooperation	IPRCC	Regions	TC	Research, KS, training, cooperation, exchange	Policy dialogue	2	SSC
DAD – South-South learning on aid information and development effectiveness	SIS, UNDP, IATI, Armenia	Multiple countries	TC	Workshop, training	Survey, evaluation	2	Triangular

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
Indonesia-Japan – Participatory Agriculture Extension	AAHRD (Indonesia) (JICA funding)	Multiple countries	TC	Training, expert dispatch	-	2	Triangular
Indonesia-Japan – Training on Artificial Insemination of Dairy Cattle	SNAIC (Indonesia) (JICA funding-J-SEEAM)	Multiple countries	TC	Training	Pre and post tests	2	Triangular
ITEC India – Indian expertise for sustainable development	India	Multiple countries	TC	Training	-	2	SSC
Japan – Innovative triangular cooperation with ASEAN countries (JARCOM)	Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand (JICA funding)	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Vietnam, Timor-Leste	TC	Workshop, KS	Participatory monitoring, Joint formulation and incentives, Partnership agreement and cost-sharing	1 or 2	Triangular
Japan – South-South Networking around Paddy Fields	INWEPF (Japan funding)	INWEPF countries	TC	Meeting, KS	-	2	Triangular

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
Korea-Bangladesh – ICT Training Centre for education	Korea	Bangladesh	Infrastructure & TC	Infrastructure, training	-	1	Traditional (Korea)
Laos-Ghana-Zambia – Learning on road maintenance	Ghana and Zambia (partially WB funding)	Lao PDR	TC	Workshop, study tours, exchange	-	2	Unclear
Laos-Vietnam –Exchanging on Local Administration Reform	Vietnam (JICA funding)	Lao PDR	TC	Workshop	-	1	Triangular
Malaysia-Japan – Achieving Peace in Multi-Cultural Societies	Malaysia (Japan funding)	Multiple countries (Islam)	TC	Training, workshop, study tour	Dialogue	2	Triangular
Slum Dwellers International – Mutual learning for human development	SDI (Multi-donor funding)	SDI affiliates	TC	Exchange, networking	-	2	Unclear
Thailand – Asia-Pacific Development Center on Disability	APCD (Thailand) (JICA funding)	Multiple countries	TC	Training, workshop, seminar, documentation, networking, collaboration	-	2	Unclear

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
Thailand ACMECS – Human resources development	TICA	CLMV (bilateral projects only, though)	TC	Training, scholarship, expert dispatch, partnership	ACMECS Summit to Ministerial Meeting every two year, review every two year, sector working group for monitoring	1	SSC
Vietnam-Nepal – Exchange on development strategies	Nepal-Vietnam (JICA facilitation)	Nepal-Vietnam	TC	Exchange	-	1	Triangular

Appendix II. Case Summary: Africa Region

* Typology / 1: TC-B, 2: TC-M, 3: Infra-B, 4: Infra-M

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
Generating Electricity in South Sudan	Egypt	South Sudan	Infrastructure & TC	Construction, training, follow-up consultation	Periodic and final reports, information to all stakeholders - Challenges: Weak means of telecommunication, Different perspectives of implementing agencies, Weak transportation infrastructure, Poor water and sanitation systems, Political instability and lack of security	3	SSC
Egypt – South Sudan Establishing Two Family Medical Units in South Sudan	Egypt	South Sudan	Infrastructure & TC	Construction, training	Coordination meetings, monitoring, environment study before commencement - Challenges: Weather, Economic situation in Egypt after revolution	3	SSC

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
Winning the Peace and Starting (Re)construction in Southern Sudan	Multi donors	South Sudan	TC	Seminar, KS, research, negotiations	-	2	Neither SSC nor Triangular
Kenya - Insect Science -- Building capacity for science-led development in Africa: icipe's postgraduate trainings in insect science	ICIPE (Multi-donor funding)	Multiple countries	TC	Postgraduate training	-	2	Triangular
AfCoP – Pan-African peer learning on managing for results	AfCoP-MfDR	AfCoP-MfDR members (Multi-donor funding)	TC	KS, peer-to-peer exchange	M&E, WB & AfDB intervention on online platform, annual meeting	1 or 2	Unclear
Africa Rice center – New Rice for Africa	China, Colombia, Philippines, Japan	Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Sierra Leone, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Mali, Liberia, Burkina Faso	TC	Research, partnership	Evaluation meetings	2	Triangular

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
African Union – African Peer Review Mechanism	APRM	AU members	-	Launch of APRM in the government system	Peer pressure, APR Panel (APRM itself is a self-monitoring mechanism) - Challenges: Weaknesses of political-processes	2	Unclear
AWEPA – Parliaments joining efforts in the fight against small arms	AWEPA	Great Lakes Region/ Horn of Africa	TC	Exchange, conference	-	1 or 2	Unclear
Brazil World Bank – Sharing a quiet social revolution	Brazil (WB & DFID funding)	Multiple countries	TC	KS, study tour	-	1 or 2	Triangular
Brazil-Angola-Japan – Building capacities at the Josina Machel Hospital	Brazil (Japan funding)	Angola	TC	Training	Minutes of Meeting, public advocacy (major mass communication), follow-up meeting, joint monitoring mission - Challenges: Lack of infrastructure such as water, electricity, telephone and internet	1	Triangular

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
China-Africa –Experience Sharing on Development	IPRCC (China-WB co-funding)	Multiple countries	TC	Workshop, field visit, exchange	-	2	Unclear
Competence Sharing Amongst NGO partners in South and East Africa	CSNP (Norad)	Multiple countries	TC	Annual meeting	Mutual accountability was an area of slight tension in the project between the donor and the steering group. More mutual accountability was desirable, but in this case not essential. - Challenges: Lack of funding	2	Triangular
Cuba Africa-Promoting integrated health services	Cuba (partially Multi-donor funding)	Multiple countries	TC	Expert dispatch	-	1 or 2	SSC (partially triangular)
Cuba-Egypt–Joint Manufacturing on Vaccines	Cuba	Egypt	TC	Technology transfer & joint production	- Challenge: Delays on the Egyptian side caused by registration impediments and in responses by the Cuban side have led to extension of the various phases of implementing this initiative	1	SSC

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
Development Gateway – Spreading and Sharing Aid Management Practices	Development Gateway	Multiple countries	TC	Workshop, learning network	Feedback loop	2	Neither SSC nor Triangular
Egypt-Uganda – Aquatic Weed Control	Egypt	Uganda	Infrastructure/Investment	Construction, training	- Challenges: Initial misperception, Transportation of the project's heavy and bulky equipment, Approval of tax exemptions, Risk health hazards	1	SSC
IBSA-Guinea Bissau – Boosting food self-sufficiency	IBSA	Guinea-Bissau	TC	Training	-	2	SSC
Germany-Brazil-Mozambique – Sharing quality standards	Brazil (Germany funding)	Mozambique	TC	Training, seminar, study tour	M&E - Challenges: To achieve an adequate flow of communication, The process of building mutual confidence	1	Triangular

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
India-Pan-African e-network for medical services and human resources	India	AU members	-	Technology transfer, education	There is also no requirement of mutual accountability, which leaves TCIL itself unmonitored, in its process of implementation. So for example, when service delivery in certain countries is delayed from TCIL's side, it goes unnoticed.	2	SSC
India-Tanzania-Uganda – Boosting dairy cooperatives	India (WB funding)	Tanzania, Uganda	TC	KS, study tour	-	2	Triangular
Indonesia-Japan – Institutionalizing Micro Finance in Africa	NAM-CSS TC (Indonesia) (JICA funding)	Multiple countries	TC	Training, workshop	Maintaining contact with ex-participants after the training, follow-up mission	2	Triangular
Kenya-Japan – Mathematics and Science Education in Africa	Kenya (JICA funding)	Multiple countries	TC	Teacher training, workshop, expert dispatch	M&E	2	Triangular

Title	Provider	Recipient	Modality	Delivery Methods	Evaluation Methods for MA	Typology (1~4)	Categorisation
Kenya-Japan – Social forestry in Africa	Kenya (JICA funding)	Multiple countries	TC	Training	JICA's evaluation system	2	Triangular
NEPAD – Investing in agriculture and food security in Africa	AU/CAAD P/NEPAD (Multi-donor trust fund)	Multiple countries	Infrastructure/ Investment & TC	-	African participating countries in the CAADP programme do recognize that accountability and efficient government are the necessary direction to be taken for economic prosperity of the continent, thus allowing themselves to be guided by development experts through CAADP.	4	Unclear
NEPAD – Promoting e-schools in Africa	NEPAD	APRM members	TC	E-School program, partnership (PPP)	M&E report	2	SSC

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The Prospects of Mutual Accountability in South-South Cooperation

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